## EU CP

### 2NC – France

#### France nuclear deterrent solves—Macron announced intention to create a European based nuclear deterrent

Benjamin Hautecouverture 2020, He is a Senior research fellow for arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament issues at the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique. He is the Technical Director of the EU Partner to Partner programme of the European Union for the implementation and universalisation of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), at Expertise France. He is also a founding member as well as a manager of the EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium since 2010., September 2020, “President Macron on French Nuclear Deterrence”, <https://www.cgai.ca/president_macron_on_french_nuclear_deterrence> //skwon

Deterrence with a European Dimension, Arms Control and Disarmament

A much-anticipated part of last February’s speech was the role of French deterrence in the European context. Macron followed on his predecessors by taking a further step in opening up to European partners. Thus, “France lives in a web of interests that extends beyond its borders. It is not isolated. Western Europe as a whole cannot therefore fail to benefit indirectly from French strategy, which is a stable and determining factor in European security.” This broader interpretation of France’s vital interests is therefore reaffirmed, Macron stating that “our nuclear forces ... strengthen European security by their very existence and in this respect have a genuinely European dimension.”

Next, Macron proposed to pursue a “strategic dialogue” on the role of nuclear deterrence with those European countries that wish to do so. France’s ambition is to shape a “shared European strategic culture”. Macron suggested that European countries wishing to participate should join “exercises with French deterrent forces”. It should be noted, however, that this option does not mean setting up an integrated structure like the one that exists in NATO.

Finally, the president placed great emphasis on the importance of a common strategic culture in Europe in order to evolve in the field of arms control and disarmament.

Macron recalled the foundations of France’s disarmament policy, French achievements and French priorities in this area: compliance with the NPT, negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for weapons (“cut-off treaty”) and universalization of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), continuing work on verification and the launch of work on reducing strategic risks. Macron defended France’s logic, according to which disarmament is not an end in itself, but rather makes it possible to increase everyone’s security. His speech therefore seeks to rebuild a European disarmament policy on security considerations and not on ideological or strictly humanitarian considerations.

On the subject of arms control, Macron called on his European partners to wake up to “once again understand the dynamics of escalation and seek to prevent or avert them by means of clear, verifiable standards”. In particular, he said that any new agreement on nuclear forces in Europe should include Europeans, and that discussions in this area “must not go over our heads”. In general, the president argued that Europe needs to develop “a very clear position” that “takes into account ... the evolution of contemporary armaments” and allows it to defend its interests and what it considers favourable to the preservation of strategic stability on the continent.

It will now be a question of monitoring French initiatives. Naturally, the methods to be used by French diplomacy will be decisive in winning the support of France’s partners.

French nuclear umbrella deters aggressors from targeting EU member countries—similar interests

Tom Sauer 2019, Tom Sauer is a post-doctoral research fellow of the Flemish Fund for Scientific Research and a lecturer at the Department of Politics at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in Belgium, December 2019, “Power and Nuclear Weapons: The Case of the European Union”, <https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2020.1764260> //skwon

Status-quo

After Brexit there will only be one EU member state (France) that possesses nuclear weapons, while the EU institutions themselves – because of internal divisions amongst the member states – keep silent on nuclear deterrence. Interestingly, neither the Ban Treaty nor the Eurobomb is much discussed at the yearly gatherings of the EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium, a consortium of think-tanks in the EU.

France and the UK have negotiated bilateral agreements in 1992 and 2010 with respect to their nuclear arsenals, including a mutual defense clause. Both states “do not see situations arising in which the vital interests of either Party could be threatened without the vital interests of the other also being threatened” (Perot 2019, 2). Whether those arguments will stay alive after the Brexit remains to be seen.

As a result of the mutual defense clause of the Lisbon Treaty, the French nuclear weapons are also used to deter attacks against other EU member states, though implicitly. Already a long time ago, France made clear that the security interests of the other EU member states are regarded as similar to the security interests of France. For instance, French Defense Minister Chevènement stated in October 1989: “It is not necessary for the radius of action of France’s deterrence to be declaratively extended to the territory of the FRG to apply there de facto, according to the concept of ‘vital interests’” (quoted by Palmer 1991, 54). President Sarkozy extended that notion to the EU in 2008: “As for Europe, it is a fact: by their very existence, French nuclear forces are a key element in Europe’s security. Any aggressor who might consider challenging it must be mindful of this” (quoted in Jasper & Portela, 161). That idea was repeated in the more recent Franco-German Cooperation and Integration Treaty, signed in Aachen on 22 January 2019. That Treaty does not refer to NATO being central for collective defense, in contrast to the Lisbon Treaty, and contains a mutual defense clause with respect to Germany. But it uses the words “security interests” instead of “vital interests”, which, according to Perot (2019) who is affiliated with the Brussels based Egmont Institute, “could be interpreted as a persisting timidity when it comes to explicit references to nuclear deterrence within the Franco-German relationship”.

#### US conventional deterrence is unsustainable—waning public approval and Asia Pivot means European allies must be at the forefront of European deterrence

Geddings,Larry Jr V. 2018, Project Convergence Director at US Army Futures and Concepts Center at Us Army, May 2018, “European Deterrence for European Assurance: The United States and Russian Adventurism in the Crimea”, School of Advanced Military Studies US Army Command and General Staff College //skwon

Unsustainable Reassurance and Deterrence The United States’ conventional deterrence policy initially labeled the European Reassurance Initiative, and later re-titled the European Deterrence Initiative, was, and will remain, unsustainable in the face of a resurgent Russia in the early twenty-first century. The US deterrent strategy in Europe was in direct competition for US military presence and influence with other regions of the world. A perceived lack of return on investment, fiscal considerations, and a general weariness caused an erosion of American interest in a uniquely European problem. Without European allies and partners taking a front row seat in the security and stability of Eastern Europe, the threat of overt Russian adventurism will remain.

The United States’ tenure as a patron in Europe will continue, but, at a less intensive level than the expenditure and effort seen between 2014 and 2017. The fiscal expenditure of continual Army Armored Brigade Combat Team deployments, colossal military construction costs for forward positioning air forces and basing, and the political capital spent for national and international consensus will certainly curtail as the tangible outcomes of the reassurance and deterrence efforts become more common and less palatable by the voting American public. Fading images of “little green men” in Crimea from memory will lead to the questions of the necessity and effectiveness of US deterrence measures and the expected outcomes of those efforts.50 Additionally, the sustainability of a forward positioned rotation of almost exclusively US forces against a patient adversary is fiscally unlikely. A persistent Russia looking to regain hegemonic power far away from American shores will tax the American citizen in time, dollars, and perseverance making the possibility of a long-term commitment untenable. Finally, America cannot afford to wager on the European theater as the next significant defense and political challenge with a rising China in the Asia-Pacific region.

#### EU is increasing its military defense—US decline means that Europe must step up to protect itself

Tom Sauer 2019, Tom Sauer is a post-doctoral research fellow of the Flemish Fund for Scientific Research and a lecturer at the Department of Politics at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in Belgium, December 2019, “Power and Nuclear Weapons: The Case of the European Union”, <https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2020.1764260> //skwon

The EU is generally regarded as a soft or “normative” power (Manners 2002). While the original goal of the European project in the 1950 s was maintaining peace, its main instrument was economic cooperation. That said, already in 1952 the European Defense Community was set up, only to be vetoed by the French Assembly two years later. It is probably no coincidence that in the same period French Prime Minister Mendès-France started up a secret nuclear weapons program. Jean Monnet – one of the founding fathers of the European Community – was against the force de frappe because in his view it was incompatible with the fact that Germany was constitutionally not allowed to possess nuclear weapons.

Since then, European integration made progress on a step-by-step basis, including the establishment of the European Economic Community and Euratom in 1957, the latter aiming to create a European free zone for nuclear fuel, i.e. uranium4. Unsurprisingly, Europe was called “a civilian power”. Duchène (1972), then director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), predicted in the beginning of the 1970 s: “Europe would be the first major area of the Old World where the age-old process of war and indirect violence could be translated into something more in tune with the twentieth-century citizen’s notion of civilized politics. In such a context, Western Europe could in a sense be the first of the world’s civilian centres of power” … ’Europe will be a giant middle power’. Similar ideas were still heard in the 1990 s, despite the announcement of a Common Foreign and Security Policy by the Treaty of Maastricht (1991). Christopher Hill (1996, my emphasis), for instance, stated: “Where [European Political Cooperation] is weak in leverage, it is strong on values … and European diplomacy has steadily become associated in the public mind with a distinct set of principles”. Earlier on, Hill (1990) had characterized the EU “a civilian power”. Later on, Manners (2002, 241, my emphasis) triggered a lively academic debate describing the EU as “a normative power”. He argued: “This combination of historical context, hybrid polity and legal constitution has, in the post-cold war period, accelerated a commitment to placing universal norms and principles at the centre of its relations with its member states and the world”. Also Sjursen (2003, 38) claimed that “the EU has considerable impact on the international system”, in a liberalist sense.

That said, since the end of the Cold War, steps have been taken to give body to a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including in the field of defense. For instance, respectively Javier Solana, Catherine Ashton, Federica Mogherini and Joseph Borell have taken up the position of High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, leading the European External Action Service. An EU Military Committee aided by a EU Military Staff – be it small-scale (in comparison with NATO) – has been set up in Brussels. The EU initiated both civilian and military interventions, be it low-risk, around the world. A European Defense Agency (EDA) and a European Defense Fund (EDF) have been created. It was also the E(U)-3 that negotiated a deal with Iran in 2003 and that was successful in coordinating the multilateral talks that led to the Joint Common Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015 (Sauer 2007, Sauer 2019a). The Lisbon Treaty (2009) included the notion of an integrated security policy and foresees the possibility of creating a common defense. The Treaty also included a mutual defense clause in the sense that if one member state is attacked, the other member states have the “obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power”(art.42.7). It also contains the possibility to integrate further with a limited group of member states in the framework of PESCO. The EU Global Strategy (2016) introduced the concept of “strategic autonomy”. But – as sceptics do not hesitate to repeat all the time – progress with respect to European defense integration is slow, especially in comparison with NATO. Even the Lisbon Treaty continues to regard NATO as the main security organization responsible for collective defense. In short, European defense today can be described as a glass half full or a glass half empty. Experts are divided between Atlanticists and Europeanists.

The assumption in this article is that despite the financial crisis in 2008–2009, the Brexit, and the Corona-crisis, the European integration will continue, including in the military sphere. The European Monetary Union (EMU) requires better political oversight, and phenomena like migration, global warming and pandemics can better be managed on a European scale than on a national scale. The trend towards more political integration (including foreign, security and defense policy) in all likelihood will continue, be it maybe at a slower rate than in the past. One of the side-effects of Brexit is progress made in the field of defense integration, as the UK was always skeptical.

In addition, there is an important factor that may further stimulate European defense integration: the shifting balance of power in the world with China on the rise and the US on the (relative) decline. As a result, there are more and more voices in the US that argue for isolationism or restraint, or at least offshore balancing (Posen 2014; Walt 2018). President Trump does not stand alone in his request to spend less money on US alliances, especially NATO. Many Americans believe that Europe should take up its responsibility to protect itself. Trump has stated on different occasions – both before and after his election – that NATO is obsolete (although – paradoxically – he has sent more US troops to Europe). While NATO is still regarded as the main security framework in Europe, there are more and more cracks in the wand (Sauer 2019b). In January 2019, there were even rumors that the US would leave NATO (Barnes & Cooper 2019). From a European point of view, the most logical alternative for the Atlantic Alliance is EU defense integration. If NATO stops to exist, which admittedly is still unlikely in the foreseeable future, the EU (or a core group within the EU) in all likelihood will take over.

### 1NC – Solvency – Cyber

#### EU’s Strategic Compass solves cyber deterrence

Constantine Atlamazoglou and Jason C. Moyer 2022, Constantine Atlamazoglou is a European Security Analyst/Journalist at the Wilson Center and holds a master's degree on security studies and European affairs from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; Jason C. Moyer is a Program Associate for the Global Europe Program at The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Previously, he was the Program Manager for the Foreign Policy Institute at Johns Hopkins SAIS, the Dean's research institute, and he was the Program Coordinator for the Center for Transatlantic Relations, a transatlantic think tank. He is also a Fellow for the Transatlantic Leadership Network.; “A Strategic Compass: The European Union expands its toolbox”, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/strategic-compass-european-union-expands-its-toolbox> //skwon

In Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s class at Georgetown University, she likened each element of U.S. power - development aid, sanctions, bilateral diplomacy, multilateral diplomacy - to a tool in the U.S. problem-solving toolbox. When faced with a challenge, the United States can employ one or more of these tools. With the launch of the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, the European Union is adding a handful of new tools to its own toolbox, to better respond to current and future challenges.

Promising a “quantum leap” in decisive security matters in the next decade, the EU is stepping into its role as a security provider and global actor. The document is significant for the EU; it can be seen as a parallel to the United States’ National Security Strategy in its scope.

A comprehensive creation process

This is the first time in EU history that a threat analysis was conducted with each member-state inputting its strategic priorities. The Strategic Compass began in June 2020 as an attempt to align EU defense and security goals between the 27 member-states. Therefore, national priorities were translated into European priorities through the diplomatic process. The major threats the EU faces were identified as great power competition, potential instability in its neighborhood, and transnational threats, including cyber and hybrid attacks.

Staying relevant

Nevertheless, the document realizes the fluidity of the geopolitical environment and the shifting nature and magnitude of threats. Thus, the Strategic Compass promises to be the first step in regular evaluations of the evolving strategic environment, stipulating that a new threat analysis will be conducted every three years, allowing changes to the EU’s strategy.

The document’s existence is proof that the EU is positioning itself to better respond to strategic challenges. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine began right at the end of the Strategic Compass process. Although the document acknowledges the crisis in its introduction, it was clearly drafted before war returned to the European continent. As such the document is not a reflection of the war. It is likely that the next iteration of the threat analysis will more prominently feature Russian tactics on display in Ukraine. Nevertheless, many aspects of the Strategic Compass will better prepare the EU for the tense geopolitical environment brought about by the emerging great-power competition.

New tools in the toolbox

The Strategic Compass contains a myriad of timelines and actionable items. Among them is the goal that by 2025 an EU Rapid Deployment Capacity of 5,000 troops will be ready.

The specificity and concrete timelines proposed in this document demonstrate the resolve of the European Union to become a power broker in the next decade. The schedule, while ambitious, is not impossible provided the interest for greater European sovereignty continues among EU member-states.

Further, the Strategic Compass creates a new Hybrid Toolbox and Response Teams, enhances the Cyber Diplomatic Toolbox and Cyber Defence Policy, Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Toolbox, and an EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence. The document notes that hybrid threats are growing in scale and scope, specifically mentioning that China and Russia have utilized hybrid tactics. The Hybrid Toolbox will allow for a faster, coordinated attribution of attacks. The Strategic Compass will further strengthen the existing Cyber Diplomatic Toolbox, which has grown from a budget of €11 million in 2017 to almost double to €21.7 million in 2020. Enhancing the toolbox, solidifying the EU’s Joint Cyber Unit, further developing the EU’s Cyber Defense Policy will be instrumental to deter cyber attacks. The Strategic Compass outlines how information manipulation threatens not only Ukraine but aspiring member-states; as a response, a new toolbox being developed in coordination with the European Democracy Action Plan. Many of the tools highlighted in the Strategic Compass, such as the Cyber Diplomatic Policy and the EU Space Strategy, have either been underutilized or underdeveloped, but the changing nature of conflict, as is prominently on display in Ukraine, calls for the EU to sharpen and enhance these tools.

Geographically, the Strategic Compass references security on a global level. However its emphasis is on the transatlantic relationship and the regions neighboring the EU reflecting their special importance to the bloc. Specifically, it calls for a strengthening of NATO-EU cooperation both on the political and the military level. It also calls for continuing the momentum created by the 2021 EU-US Summit Statement, a political declaration of EU-US partnership across multiple sectors. Further, regarding the EU’s neighboring regions, focus is placed on Africa, particularly the Sahel and West Africa, and the EU’s immediate east. Indeed Africa has repeatedly been identified as a region of primary geostrategic importance for the EU as instability in the continent crosses the Mediterranean; while Europe’s east, from Moldova to Georgia, is facing Russia’s belligerency and destabilizing acts.

A stronger transatlantic partner

The Strategic Compass does not seek to replace or undermine NATO. Instead, as the document stresses multiple times, by implementing it, the EU will become a more valuable partner for both NATO and the United States. The document is underpinned by multiple major announcements for increased defense spending in light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. For the United States, this means the EU will do more to provide for its own security.

As Stefano Sannino the Secretary General of the European External Action Service recently said during an event at the Wilson Center, “The aggression of Russia against Ukraine has generated a sense and need of unity within the European Union and between the European Union and the United States; and I would say the transatlantic community more in general.” The Strategic Compass will contribute to that unity.

Avoiding bumps ahead

Nevertheless, the EU needs to ensure that its mechanisms contribute effectively to transatlantic unity.

Perhaps the most striking stipulation of the Strategic Compass is the creation of a 5,000-strong force able to swiftly deploy to non-permissive environments. The force is to include air, land, and maritime components along with strategic enablers. It will be enabled through the substantial modification of the EU Battlegroups and the member-states that will participate with troops and capabilities will be pre-identified.

However, NATO currently has the NATO Response Force (NRF) which can start deploying globally within one to four weeks and a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) that can start deploying within two days. EU member-states that are also part of NATO are major contributors to the NRF and VJTF. Therefore, there is risk of operational redundancy between the EU and NATO’s components.

Additionally, due to the high number of initiatives put forth by the Strategic Compass the risk of some of them falling behind schedule or underdelivering is present. Nevertheless, besides the obstacles ahead, the importance of the document for the geopolitical future of the EU should not be underestimated.

A step in the right direction

The Strategic Compass is currently a guiding document – a framework for transforming the EU, traditionally an economic and, more recently, a political instrument, to include a stronger security element. The war in Ukraine has led European countries that had grappled with balancing military power and welfare systems to now put more effort into their security capabilities.

If the implementation of the Strategic Compass reflect the impressive political effort it took to draft it, the EU and its neighboring regions stand to benefit. During an era in which war has returned to Europe and traditional geopolitical dynamics are shifting, the Strategic Compass has the potential to become a roadmap for the EU’s future as a security provider and markedly contribute to Europe and its neighboring regions’ security and prosperity.

### 2NC – AT: Deterrence

#### The EU’s recent initiatives establish enough deterrence to meet today’s security challenge – they’ve shifted priorities

Latici ’18 [Tania; July of 2018; Fellow with the Transatlantic Leadership Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis, doing a PhD on transatlantic defense cooperation at the University of Ghent and with the European Security and Defence College; "European Deterrence Initiative: the transatlantic security guarantee," European Parliament, <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/625117/EPRS_BRI(2018)625117_EN.pdf> //smarx, AZG]

The illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia in March 2014 marked a crucial moment for European, transatlantic and international security. Acting like a wake-up call, this event redefined strategic and security considerations in individual EU Member States, in the United States and in international organisations such as the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Russia's increasingly assertive military posture is unsettling for its European neighbours. Four years ago, in June 2014, US President Obama announced what was to become a key security guarantee from America to Europe. The European Reassurance Initiative, as it was called during the first half of its existence, is a military programme supporting the activities of the US military and its allies in Europe. In 2017, it was renamed the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) to reflect the shift in the international security environment characterised by a prioritisation of deterrence. Activities under the EDI include training of forces, multinational military exercises and development of military equipment and capabilities. They all take place under the umbrella of Operation Atlantic Resolve (OAR) whose core mission is to enhance deterrence. Despite recent turmoil in transatlantic relations, the budget for building up defences in central and eastern Europe through the EDI has seen major increases; even under the Trump administration. The EDI has deepened security and defence cooperation between the US and the main beneficiaries of OAR, namely Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. The US European Command, which coordinates all EDI and OAR activities, is working to forge enhanced interoperability between different countries' military forces through joint training, staff exchanges and exercises. The Command's leadership also recognises the cyber domain as a pressing area where integration is needed, although the EDI budget for 2019 makes no mention of it. The recent proliferation of EU defence initiatives and the revamp of EU-NATO relations should also contribute to EDI's core mission: to establish a strong deterrence posture able to meet today's security challenges.

#### EU-NATO cooperation solves deterrence – broad coordination allows for extended deterrence

Nagashima ’21 [Jun; 05/18/21; Master’s in European Security from the Tsukuba University, Adjunct Professor, Graduate School of Security Studies, National Defense Academy, Lieutenant General (Retired); "European Strategic Autonomy and Nuclear Deterrence- Progress of EU-NATO Cooperation and Impact on the Indo-Pacific Region –," International Information Network Analysis | SPF, <https://www.spf.org/iina/en/articles/nagashima_06.html> //smarx, AZG]

In view of the circumstances surrounding the EU, the best solution for responding to the nuclear threat that Europe faces is not to use the European nuclear deterrence approach proposed by France, but to develop a cooperative nuclear posture through loosely-based cooperation, within a scope that does not violate the sovereignty of the nuclear countries(U.S., U.K. and France), as a part of the strengthening of the current EU-NATO relationship. This means a political process in which the items related to nuclear deterrence will be added to EU-NATO cooperation, and consultations and coordination on specific nuclear cooperation are started at a working-level. Albeit in the form of NATO's provision of extended nuclear deterrence to the EU, this is a realistic response that the EU, with its complicated nuclear issues, can tolerate in terms of strategic autonomy.

In other words, it is difficult for the European Union to achieve strategic autonomy in the core part of its nuclear deterrence strategy, and the solution is cooperation with NATO. Needless to say, NATO is an alliance centered on the United States, which contradicts the direction of Europe's strategic autonomy. However, I think that realistic decisions made by the EU, without being swept away by ideals, should be appreciated from a broader perspective.

#### Post-Ukraine, Europe has deterrent power – they know they can lose America’s reliability because of Republicans

Schult ’22 [Christoph; 04/14/22; M.A. in School of Oriental and African Studies with the University of London; and Britta Sandberg, studied political science, history and American studies at the LMU in Munich and at the Institut des Sciences Politiques in Paris; and René Pfister, studied political science in Munich and completed an apprenticeship at the German School of Journalism, Office manager in Washington DC since summer 2019; "A European Bomb: Debate over Nuclear Deterrence Heats Up in the EU," Der Spiegel, <https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/a-european-bomb-debate-over-nuclear-deterrence-heats-up-in-the-eu-a-88ab0869-67c6-4bc9-bdff-75c32340b56c> //smarx, AZG]

A Number of Delusions

The war in Eastern Europe has exposed a number of delusions. The idea that Russian natural gas deliveries couldn’t be used as a political weapon, for example. Or that Putin’s megalomania was just the standard Kremlin huffing and puffing. "Those who deploy violence to shift borders will do so again and again," German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said at the end of March. "And that is why we must together make ourselves strong enough to ensure that that doesn’t happen."

In response to Putin’s aggression, Scholz has said that his government intends to inject 100 billion euros into Germany’s defense, while Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock has promised to develop a national security strategy by the end of the year that reflects Germany’s interests. Berlin, astoundingly, has never before had such a strategy.

Already, though, it is becoming apparent just how difficult it might be to come up with a convincing plan for European security. What might happen if the U.S. was to withdraw from NATO and leave Europe alone with a dictator who violates all established norms and doesn’t even stop at slaughtering civilians ?

It is a question that American think tanks are currently focusing on more intently than is the government in Berlin. Once again, it would seem, the German government’s penchant for denying reality is on full display. "I found German passivity toward Donald Trump when he was elected president in 2016 shocking," says Max Bergmann of the Center for American Progress, a think tank in Washington with ties to the Democratic Party. "I didn't quite understand how, you know, Europeans would sort of pretend as if nothing had changed and if America was completely reliable."

That could be the case as long as Joe Biden is still in the White House. But the 79-year-old Democrat’s approval rating is historically low, and with the November 2024 election rapidly approaching, the party doesn’t seem to have a promising replacement candidate either.

Within the Republican Party, meanwhile, there is a powerful group that would prefer to see the U.S. turn its back on NATO. Last Tuesday, 63 Republicans in the House of Representatives voted against a resolution affirming U.S. support for NATO. One day later, the pollsters at Pew published a survey according to which 82 percent of Democratic voters believe that the U.S. benefits from the Western alliance, but just 55 percent of Republicans agree. It isn’t a completely absurd idea to think that Trump could run an explicitly anti-NATO campaign and that it might even prove successful, says Michael O’Hanlon, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and a member of the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board. "If all these things play out in a bad way, then I think Europe has some very fundamental and difficult choices, and one of them could include the idea of developing a European-wide nuclear deterrent."

#### The EU can jointly contribute to deterrence – new efforts can achieve atomic weapons

Schult ’22 [Christoph; 04/14/22; M.A. in School of Oriental and African Studies with the University of London; and Britta Sandberg, studied political science, history and American studies at the LMU in Munich and at the Institut des Sciences Politiques in Paris; and René Pfister, studied political science in Munich and completed an apprenticeship at the German School of Journalism, Office manager in Washington DC since summer 2019; "A European Bomb: Debate over Nuclear Deterrence Heats Up in the EU," Der Spiegel, <https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/a-european-bomb-debate-over-nuclear-deterrence-heats-up-in-the-eu-a-88ab0869-67c6-4bc9-bdff-75c32340b56c> //smarx, AZG]

It is a diplomatic way of saying that Germany must prepare for a scenario in which the Americans can no longer be relied on. Heusgen served Merkel in the Chancellery for 12 years and is one of the most experienced security policy practitioners in Europe. In summer 2017, half a year after Trump’s inauguration, Heusgen was sent to New York as Germany’s ambassador to the United Nations, and he is now head of the Munich Security Conference. The time he spent at the UN convinced Heusgen that the old trans-Atlantic certainties not longer apply. That, too, has motivated him to speak up.

Europeans must be prepared to do far more for deterrence and defense, Heusgen says. He views the 100-billion-euro spending package for the German military to be an absolute necessity. "But in addition to that, I believe we should begin a strategic dialogue with France focused on whether and how Europeans can jointly contribute to a nuclear deterrence against Russia. One model could involve the German government and other EU member states contributing financially to the French nuclear weapons program in return for a say in the planning and deployment of French atomic weapons."

Heusgen would like to see such talks embedded in efforts to form a real political union, one which would remain a partner of the U.S. He is very much aware, after all, that there have been periodic efforts in Paris to disconnect from the U.S. And it wasn’t all that long ago that French President Emmanuel Macron described NATO as being "brain dead" – a formulation that many in Berlin found to be extremely unfortunate. What’s the point, after all, of wantonly bad-mouthing the trans-Atlantic defensive alliance? For Heusgen, a European nuclear umbrella would in no way be an end in itself, but rather a kind of insurance policy should NATO become unreliable.

### 2NC – AT: France Willpower

#### France will cooperate with all of Europe – European security helps them too

Bugos ’20 [Shannon; March of 2020; Senior Policy Analyst at the Arms Control Association, research assistant in the International Scholars Program at the University of Notre Dame; "France Offers Nuclear Deterrent to All Europe," Arms Control Association, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-03/news/france-offers-nuclear-deterrent-europe> //smarx, AZG]

French President Emmanuel Macron offered to begin discussing with other European countries the role that France’s nuclear deterrent can play in their collective security.

France’s nuclear forces “strengthen the security of Europe through their very existence,” Macron said at the military school École de Guerre in Paris on Feb. 7. An erosion of “the comprehensive security framework” that protects Europe affects France’s defense strategy, he said, which means that “France’s vital interests now have a European dimension.” France’s nuclear deterrence “ensures our independence, our freedom to assess, make decisions, and take action. It prevents adversaries from betting on escalation, intimidation, and blackmailing to achieve their ends,” he said before extending the offer.

At the same time, Macron argued that the international community must limit the role of nuclear deterrence to “extreme circumstances of self-defense,” with the overall goal of preventing war.

“France’s nuclear doctrine strictly adheres to this framework,” he said. France currently has about 300 nuclear weapons in its arsenal.

During his address, Macron outlined three “paradigm shifts” underway in the world. The first he described as strategic, in which “a new hierarchy of powers” is emerging and bringing with it the heightened risk of conflict and military escalation due to competition.

The challenging of “a multilateral order based on law” defines the second paradigm shift, he said, illustrated by the demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty last August. (See ACT, September 2019.) “Europeans must collectively realize today that, without a legal framework, they could quickly find themselves at risk of another conventional and even nuclear arms race on their soil,” Macron said. “They cannot stand by.”

The final shift involves the emergence of new technologies and their potential role in conflict. All of these paradigm shifts, he said, demand that the world think about what the future of war will look like. Macron suggested that the heads of state of the permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) convene in order “to fully discharge [their] mandate to maintain peace and international security” in this changing landscape.

Macron presented a four-pillared strategy for confronting these paradigm shifts and achieving peace. The first pillar he called the “promotion of an efficient multilateralism,” to include an increased investment in defense by European countries and a renewed international arms control agenda.

Regarding arms control, the president urged Europe to “rethink disarmament” so that it contributes to international security and highlighted France’s “unique track record in the world,” given its irreversible dismantlement of land-based nuclear weapons, nuclear testing facilities, and fissile material.

The next two pillars Macron described were the development of strategic alliances focused on promoting peace and security and the establishment of greater European autonomy.

Macron dubbed national sovereignty as the final pillar, saying, “if France is to live up to its ambition and its history, it must remain sovereign.”